Optimal Posted Prices for Online Cloud Resource Allocation by Zhang, Zijun et al.
Optimal Posted Prices for Online Cloud Resource Allocation
Zijun Zhang
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Calgary
zijun.zhang@ucalgary.ca
Zongpeng Li
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Calgary
zongpeng@ucalgary.ca
Chuan Wu
Dept. of Computer Science
e University of Hongkong
cwu@cs.hku.hk
ABSTRACT
We study online resource allocation in a cloud computing platform,
through a posted pricing mechanism: e cloud provider publishes
a unit price for each resource type, which may vary over time; upon
arrival at the cloud system, a cloud user either takes the current
prices, renting resources to execute its job, or refuses the prices
without running its job there. We design pricing functions based on
the current resource utilization ratios, in a wide array of demand-
supply relationships and resource occupation durations, and prove
worst-case competitive ratios of the pricing functions in terms of
social welfare. In the basic case of a single-type, non-recycled
resource (i.e., allocated resources are not later released for reuse),
we prove that our pricing function design is optimal, in that any
other pricing function can only lead to a worse competitive ratio.
Insights obtained from the basic cases are then used to generalize
the pricing functions to more realistic cloud systems with multiple
types of resources, where a job occupies allocated resources for a
number of time slots till completion, upon which time the resources
are returned back to the cloud resource pool.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, cloud computing has proliferated as the new
computing paradigm that provides exible, on-demand comput-
ing services in a pay-as-you-go fashion. Various applications and
systems today are built upon cloud computing models, including
big data analytics, cloud radio access networks (C-RAN), network
function virtualization (NFV), to name a few. Despite the common
illusion that a cloud consists of an unlimited ‘sea’ of resources,
real-world clouds are constrained by nite system capacity bounds
[17, 24] (e.g., physical capacity of a cloud data center), which may
become tight in periods of peak demands [9, 12]. A fundamental
problem in cloud computing is cloud resource allocation, i.e., to
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determine which user demands to satisfy at each time point. A com-
mon goal is to maximize the social welfare of the cloud eco-system,
which represents the aggregated ‘happiness’ of the cloud provider
and the cloud users [5].
Cloud resource allocation in practice exhibits a nature of online
decision making: cloud users with job requests arrive at the cloud
system at arbitrary time points, and the cloud provider decides
resource allocation upon each job request. A natural, de facto
standard of cloud resource allocation, is through a posted pricing
mechanism: the cloud provider publishes resource prices; cloud
users act as price takers who will decide to utilize the resources
if the prices are acceptable (i.e., its valuation of the job exceeds
the cost of resource renting), and will otherwise give up the cloud
service.
Major cloud providers today, such as Amazon Web Services,
Microso Azure, and Google Cloud, typically adopt xed prices,
i.e., resource usage is charged at xed unit prices posted on their
websites. However, a dynamic pricing strategy based on realtime
demand-supply is more ecient in many scenarios [4], to fully
exploit the resource capacity of a cloud system, and to beer satisfy
user demands. For practical cloud computing systems that employ
dynamic pricing strategies, e.g., Amazon EC2 Spot Instances [1],
the short-term prices may not be driven by realtime demand-supply
[3]; however, the price dierences across dierent service regions
and over dierent time periods are still relevant to demand and
supply. Inspired by the Spot Instances model, various dynamic
pricing strategies have been proposed in recent literature, including
auction mechanisms [13, 15, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30], and other dynamic
pricing strategies for revenue maximization and ecient cloud
resource utilization [14, 19, 26].
is work studies eective pricing functions for a cloud provider
to employ, for computing unit resource prices at each time point.
e computed prices are posted as ‘take it or leave it’ prices for
cloud users to decide whether to rent the cloud resources (user
values not revealed to the cloud provider). Such prices can also
serve in a posted-price auction mechanism for cloud job admission
and charging. With meticulously designed online prices, our goal is
to maximize the social welfare of the cloud, which equals the overall
valuation of executed user jobs, minus a possible operational cost,
over the entire system span.
While maximizing social welfare does not lead directly to max-
imizing provider revenue (a natural goal for a cloud provider to
pursue), the former is also a very meaningful goal [16, 20]. Social
welfare represents the aggregate gain of the cloud provider and
cloud users, indicating overall system eciency. Compared to max-
imizing provider revenue, maximizing social welfare ensures good
user experience, which is critical for sustainability of the system
in the long run: long-term competitiveness in the market relies on
customer happiness, which is instrumental to long-term revenue
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sustainability of the provider [28]. In addition, for public clouds
operated by nonprot organizations, and private clouds for serving
internal jobs, maximizing social welfare is more relevant than max-
imizing revenue [18]. In these cases, the pricing schemes studied in
this paper can be used as mechanisms for allocating cloud resources
to users based on their urgency and priorities. Furthermore, in the
auction design literature, there exist techniques that can relate
social welfare maximizing mechanisms with revenue maximizing
mechanisms [10].
Our study of the pricing functions has been partly inspired by
dual price design in competitive online algorithms based on the clas-
sic primal-dual framework [6, 8]. In primal-dual online algorithm
design, a key idea is to update dual prices using exponential func-
tions for making primal resource allocation decisions, leading to
provable competitive ratios. Nonetheless, no explicit justications
were provided in the literature on the choice of using exponential
dual price functions.
In this work, we borrow the exponential form of the price func-
tion from the literature on primal-dual online algorithms, and pro-
pose the optimal form of the exponential pricing functions for a
fundamental cloud resource allocation problem. We then provide
an intuitive explanation of the optimality of the exponential pricing
function. In addition, for the rst time in the literature, we general-
ize the pricing function to scenarios with bounded total demand,
where the optimal form is no longer necessarily an exponential
function. Interestingly, this result also contributes to the literature
on knapsack problems, in that our problem is closely related to a
variant of the online knapsack problem [11], where the total weight
of items is upper bounded.
We start by investigating the basic case of a single type of cloud
resource without resource recycling, and design resource pricing
functions based on the current resource utilization levels that cap-
ture realtime demand-supply of cloud resources. We prove the
optimality of our pricing function design. We then investigate the
cases of multiple resource types, and limited resource occupation
durations. Our detailed contributions are summarized below.
First, we justify the use of exponential pricing functions in the
literature of both cloud computing [13, 21, 22, 29, 30] and online
algorithms [6, 8], both from a theoretical point of view and with
intuitive interpretation. We prove the optimality of the pricing
function under mild system assumptions that are standard in recent
literature.
Second, we derive the optimal pricing functions for more real-
istic cloud resource allocation scenarios, where the potential total
demand for resources is bounded.
ird, we extend the pricing functions to take into account mul-
tiple resource types. We propose a joint pricing and scheduling
strategy when the cloud system runs over multiple time slots. We
prove tight competitive ratios for these scenarios, which were not
properly proven in previous literature. We make no assumptions
on the arrival process and the distribution of user valuations.
In addition, we further verify eectiveness of our price design
in realistic cloud computing scenarios using simulation studies, re-
laxing assumptions made in the theoretical analysis. We show that
the parameters involved in our pricing functions can be practically
optimized in dierent scenarios, to achieve consistently good per-
formance ratios, as compared to the oine optimal social welfare.
Finally, we note that our pricing models and algorithms are gen-
erally applicable to posted pricingmechanism design in other online
resource allocation systems, which share similar characteristics as
a cloud computing system.
In the rest of the paper, we review related literature in Sec. 2.
e basic and general models of cloud resource pricing are studied
in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4, respectively. Sec. 5 presents simulation studies,
and Sec. 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Recently, auction mechanisms have been extensively studied for
online cloud resource allocation and pricing. Zhang et al. [29]
design an online auction mechanism for IaaS clouds, aiming to
maximize both social welfare and provider prot. Zhou et al. [30]
extend the auctionmechanism to deal with computing jobs with so
deadlines. Shi et al. [22] propose an online mechanism for virtual
cluster allocation and pricing. ese studies exploit the primal-
dual framework for online mechanism design, and use exponential
pricing functions to compute dual prices, which decide resource
allocation and user payments. Competitive ratios of the online
mechanisms are proven, but the rational of adopting exponential
pricing functions is lacking, and the optimality of such exponential
functions are not studied. Indeed, a wide spectrum of increasing
functions are conceivable for cloud resource pricing. Our pricing
functions are applicable to both posted pricing mechanisms and
online auctions. e analysis of optimality of our pricing functions
is independent from the primal-dual framework.
Apart from auction mechanisms, a wide range of resource pric-
ing schemes have been studied in the literature. While static pricing
schemes are prevalent in today’s cloud computing market, dynamic
pricing schemes based on realtime demand-supply are shown to
be more ecient in many scenarios [4]. Li et al. [14] design a pric-
ing algorithm for cloud resources, which analyses the historical
utilization ratio of the resource, and updates current prices accord-
ingly. eir experiment demonstrates the advantage of the pricing
algorithm in terms of cost reduction and ecient resource alloca-
tion. Mihailescu and Teo [19] propose a dynamic pricing scheme for
federated clouds, where dierent cloud providers share and trade re-
sources for enhanced scalability and reliability. ey show that user
welfare and the percentage of successful requests are increased by
dynamic pricing, as compared to xed pricing. e pricing schemes
developed in this work are both dynamic and usage-based, i.e., the
unit price of cloud resource is driven by demand-supply dynamics,
and the total price is proportional to the amount and service time
of requested resources.
e online social welfare maximization problem studied in this
work related to a variant of the online knapsack problem [11]. Two
assumptions are made in this literature: the weight of each item is
much smaller than the capacity of the knapsack, and the density
(value to weight ratio) of every item falls in a known range [L,U ].
Under these assumptions, Buchbinder and Naor [6, 7] design an
algorithm achieving a competitive ratio of O (log (U /L)), as well
as an Ω (log (U /L)) lower bound on the competitive ratio of any
algorithm. In the context of advertising auctions, Zhou et al. [31]
design a (log (U /L) + 1)-competitive algorithm for an online knap-
sack problem under the above assumptions. Interestingly, their
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Table 1: Notation and denition
U set of users
R set of resource types
T set of all time slots
Ti set of time slots required by user i
di,r amount of resource r demanded by user i
di total amount of resource demanded by user i
vi value of successfully nishing user i’s job
p unit resource price at the time of user arrival
p/p lower/upper bound of vi/di
γ ratio between p and p
ρ resource utilization level
ρr *
nal resource utilization level as dened by De-
nition 3.3
β scarcity level as dened by Denition 3.1
Vol (ρ*) total value obtained by an online solution, given anal utilization level ρ*
Vopt (ρ*) total value obtained by an optimal oine solution,given a nal utilization level ρ*
algorithm is equivalent to our proposed pricing strategy for the
most basic case, as will be discussed in Sec. 3.2.1. Nevertheless, our
proof of optimality is dierent from that given by Zhou et al. [31],
and leads to an intuitive interpretation on the choice of exponential
pricing functions. More importantly, the total weight of items is
assumed to be unbounded in the previous work, which is hardly
the case for any real-world applications. In this work, we develop
a more general pricing strategy that achieves beer competitive
ratios for bounded total weight, and we prove the optimality of the
proposed strategy.
3 PRICING FOR CLOUD RESOURCE
ALLOCATION: THE BASIC CASE
In this section, we start by designing pricing functions for a basic,
yet fundamental version of the online resource allocation problem,
following the posted pricing framework as described in Algorithm
1.
Algorithm 1: Online pricing and resource allocation
Input: di ,vi ,∀i ∈ U
Output: xi ,∀i ∈ U
1 ρ = 0 ; // Initialize the resource utilization
2 for i ∈ U do
/* Upon the arrival of each user i */
3 if vi ≥ diP (ρ) and ρ + di ≤ 1 then
/* User i accepts the posted price */
4 xi = 1;
5 ρ = ρ + di ; // Allocate resource to user i
6 else
/* User i rejects the posted price */
7 xi = 0;
3.1 e Basic Resource Allocation Problem
Consider a cloud provider whose data center is for now assumed to
provision a single type of resource. e resource is to be allocated
to a large number of cloud users. e users in a set U come in
an arbitrary sequence. Upon arrival, a user decides immediately
whether to rent some of the cloud resources, by comparing the
valuation of its job with the overall price of required resources for
executing the job. Let di denote the amount of resource demanded
by a user i ∈ U, and vi be the value of successfully nishing i’s
job. A user may decidevi according to dierent factors, such as the
purpose and priority of the job, and how the user can gain from
the job completion. Without loss of generality, we normalize user
resource demands, assuming the total amount of resource in the
cloud is 1, so that di can be considered as the proportion of the
entire resource pool demanded by user i . Let p be the unit price of
the resource posted by the cloud provider, which may vary over
time. A user i accepts the price and rents resource at quantity di ,
if and only if vi ≥ dip, where p is the current unit resource price
at the time of user arrival. To put it another way, vi can be simply
seen as a threshold for whether a price is acceptable to user i . In this
section, we assume that each unit of the resource, once allocated,
will not be returned to the resource pool.
e utility of the cloud provider is the total payment received.
e utility of a served user is the valuation of its job minus its
payment. e utility of an unserved user is zero. Since payments
cancel themselves in the summation, the social welfare of the entire
cloud system, including utilities of both the cloud provider and
the cloud users, is equivalent to the total valuation of jobs that are
served, assuming no operational cost of the cloud.
Let xi indicate whether user i rents resource (at quantity di ) or
not upon its arrival. e social welfare maximization problem can
be formulated as an integer linear program (ILP):
maximize
∑
i ∈U
vixi (1)
s.t.: ∑
i ∈U
dixi ≤ 1 (1a)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ,∀i ∈ U (1b)
is is a 0-1 knapsack problem, and can be solved exactly using dy-
namic programming in the oine seing. However, for the online
problem we are investigating, the columns of the coecient matrix
of constraint (1a), corresponding to dierent online-arriving users,
are revealed one-by-one, while the value of xi is to be determined
immediately when a user comes to the cloud. We apply an online
resource allocation algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1, to decide
resource allocation given resource prices.
e performance of the posted pricing mechanisms in the on-
line resource allocation algorithm clearly depends on the pricing
function. Practically, we do not assume that users reveal their job
valuations to the cloud provider. Consequently, the pricing strategy
depends only on the demand-supply relationship of cloud resources.
We will use the standard notion of competitive ratio to evaluate the
quality of our online resource allocation solution, which is dened
as the ratio between the optimal objective value of the oine prob-
lem (1) and that of the online solution. e smaller (closer to 1) the
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competitive ratio is, the beer the online resource allocation solu-
tion. More specically, we will focus on the worst-case competitive
ratio (as opposed to average-case competitive ratio). We rst make
the following two mild assumptions:
assumption 1. e variability of users’ valuations is constrained,
i.e., p ≤ vi/di ≤ p,∀i ∈ U, where p and p are lower bound and upper
bound of the per-unit-resource job valuation of all users, respectively.
assumption 2. e resource demand of each user is much smaller
than the total resource capacity, i.e., di  1,∀i ∈ U.
Assumption 2 is reasonable when considering large-scale data
centers, where the total resource capacity refers to that of the en-
tire data center. We make this assumption mainly to facilitate our
theoretical analysis, such that techniques from calculus (dierenti-
ation) can be used, and very extreme cases can be eliminated that
are rare in practice. For example, if a high-valued bid demanding
almost all the resource from a cloud provider is rejected, because
a small fraction of the resource is occupied by other users, then
the worst-case competitive ratio can be innitely large. In addition,
such an assumption is standard in the literature of online resource
allocation [29, 30] and online knapsack problems [6, 7, 11, 31].
Nonetheless, it is also possible to relax Assumption 2 to specify-
ing an upper bound on di instead, without signicantly aecting
our theoretical result. Specically, we can use dierence equation
and summation, instead of dierential equation and integration, to
derive similar results. In addition, we will relax this assumption
completely in our empirical studies.
3.2 Pricing Function Design
We design pricing functions that adjust resource prices based on
realtime demand-supply. To this end, it is helpful to have some prior
knowledge about the total resource demand. In practice, unlimited
total resource demand is rare; an estimated upper bound on the
overall resource demand can oen be obtained. is is reected
through the following denition.
Denition 3.1. Suppose the total resource demand of all users
is upper bounded by 1 + β times the total resource supply, i.e.,∑
i ∈U di ≤ 1 + β , with β > −1. We refer to β as the scarcity level
of the resource.
It is possible to have a known lower bound on the overall resource
demand as well, but our algorithm design and analysis do not rely
on such a lower bound.
We next present the optimal pricing function for β → ∞, and
then derive the optimal pricing functions for nite β , based on
the insight we gain from the analysis of the rst case. We then
further show that the results can be extended to the case that linear
operational costs of cloud resources are considered in Sec. 3.3.
3.2.1 Pricing Function for Large Total Demand. We begin with
the case that the total demand for resource is much larger than the
capacity of the cloud resource pool. We propose an optimal pricing
function for the case that β →∞, and then show the same pricing
function is in fact optimal as long as β ≥ 1 (i.e., the upper bound
on the overall resource demand is at least twice of the resource
capacity).
Denition 3.2. In Algorithm 1, oblivious of true valuations of
users, a pricing function is optimal if it achieves the smallest possible
worst-case competitive ratio in social welfare under Assumptions 1
and 2.
Let ρ be the resource utilization level, i.e., the amount of the
resource already allocated. Note that ρ is a function of time, but
this dependency is omied for notational simplicity. e unit price
of the resource at the respective resource utilization level is denoted
by P1 (ρ), designed as follows:
P1 (ρ) =

p, ρ ∈ [0, 1/(logγ + 1)]
pe(logγ+1)ρ−1, ρ ∈ (1/(logγ + 1) , 1)
+∞, ρ = 1
, (2)
where γ = p/p. An illustration of the pricing function for p = 1,
p = 10 is given in Fig. 1 (blue lines in both subgures). Intuitively,
when ρ is quite small, it is desirable to keep the price at the lowest
level (p), to allow all potential users to rent the resource. As ρ
increases, the amount of satised demand increases, as well as the
obtained social welfare, and hence it is reasonable to raise the price
to lter out users with low valuations. When ρ = 1, the resource is
exhausted, so we use an innitely high price to reject all subsequent
users. Note that even if we need the lower bound and upper bound
of the per-unit-resource valuation in (2), when applying this pricing
function in online resource allocation, we can use estimates of the
bounds, which can be further calibrated over time when more users
have arrived and more user price taking decisions are learned.
We next prove the worst-case competitive ratio of Algorithm 1
achieved when using the pricing function in (2), as well as the opti-
mality of the pricing function when β →∞ (this default condition
omied in all lemmas, claim and theorems beforeeorem 3.8), and
then generalize the conclusion to the case β ≥ 1 in eorem 3.8.
Denition 3.3. ρ* ∈ [0, 1] denotes the nal utilization level of
the resource aer all users have decided whether to rent the cloud
resource to execute their jobs.
e following lemma implies when the nal resource utilization
level is low, the total demand of potential users also tends to be low,
thus it is possible to satisfy all user demand online.
Lemma 3.4. If ρ* ∈ [0, 1/(logγ + 1)], the worst-case competitive
ratio achieved by Algorithm 1 using the pricing function in (2) is
α1,1 = 1.
Proof. According to the pricing function in (2), for ρ ∈ [0,
1/(logγ + 1)], the unit price is a constant, p, which by Assump-
tion 1 is acceptable to any potential user, thus ρ* ∈ [0, 1/(logγ + 1)]
implies that the total demand of all users is exactly ρ*. e social
welfare achieved by the pricing function in (2) is the total value
of all users, which is also the maximum possible social welfare
achieved by solving the oine problem (1). erefore, the worst-
case competitive ratio is 1. 
For a nal utilization level ρ*, we let Vol (ρ*) be the total value
obtained by an online solution, and Vopt (ρ*) be that obtained by
an optimal oine solution. us, in any worst case, the ratio
Vopt (ρ*)/Vol (ρ*) is maximized.
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(a) e pricing function and competitive ratio.
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(b) e worst-case Vol (ρ*) and Vopt (ρ*) for ρ* = 0.7 visualized by AUCs.
Each AUC indicates the total value obtained by an online or oline solu-
tion.
Figure 1: An illustration of pricing function (2) for p = 1,
p = 10.
Lemma 3.5. If ρ* ∈ (1/(logγ + 1) , 1], the worst-case competitive
ratio achieved by Algorithm 1 using the pricing function in (2) is
α1,2 = logγ + 1.
Proof. For any ρ* ∈ (1/(logγ + 1) , 1], the worst case of the
online solution is that the valuations of satised users are the same
as the prices they accept. By Assumption 2, the minimum total
value of an online solution is
Vol (ρ*) =
∫ ρ*
0
P1 (ρ)dρ =
p
logγ + 1e
(logγ+1)ρ*−1, (3)
as shown by the blue area under the curve (AUC) in Fig. 1b. At the
same time, any unsatised user has a unit value smaller than P1 (ρ*),
because otherwise ρ* cannot be the nal resource utilization. Hence
in the worst case, there can be a set of unsatised users with a total
demand of 1 (i.e.,
∑
i ∈Uopt di = 1,∀r ∈ R, whereUopt is the set of
user chosen by the optimal oine solution), and each with a unit
value of P1 (ρ*)−ϵi , where ϵi is an arbitrarily small positive number,
such that the optimal oine solution is to satisfy their demands
with all available resource. is yields the maximum optimal oine
total value given Eq. (3):
Vopt (ρ*) =
∑
i ∈Uopt
di (p (ρ*) − ϵi ) = p (ρ*) − ϵ
= pe(logγ+1)ρ*−1 − ϵ,
(4)
as shown by the red AUC (partially covered by the blue one) in
Fig. 1b. Here, ϵ =
∑
i ∈Uopt ϵi , and hence can also be arbitrarily
small. Note that, there can be a case which leads to a larger optimal
oine total value, by increasing the online value corresponding
to ρ ∈ [0, ρ*] (i.e., the blue AUC in Fig. 1b) until it is large enough
and becomes part of the optimal oine value. However, the online
value will increase more than the optimal oine value does in this
case, making it impossible to be a worst case. erefore, the worst-
case competitive ratio α1,2 = supϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*) = logγ + 1,∀ρ* ∈
(1/(logγ + 1) , 1]. 
An illustration of the worst-case competitive ratio at dierent
nal resource utilization levels is shown in Fig. 1a (red line).
Theorem 3.6. e worst-case competitive ratio of Algorithm 1
using the pricing function in (2) is
α1 = logγ + 1. (5)
Proof. e worst-case competitive ratio of the pricing function
in (2) is the maximum possible competitive ratio for all ρ* ∈ [0, 1].
Hence following Lemma 3.4 and 3.5, α1 = max
{
α1,1,α1,2
}
= logγ+
1. 
We next show the optimality of the pricing function based on
the observation that, to achieve a nite worst-case competitive
ratio, any pricing function should contain a constant (p) part at the
beginning of the function.
Claim 3.1. If a pricing function P (ρ) achieves a nite worst-case
competitive ratio of α , then P (ρ) = p,∀ρ ∈ [0, 1/α].
Proof. If the claim does not hold and P (0) > p, there can be
a case where ρ* = 0, such that the online total value V ′ol (ρ*) = 0,
while the optimal oine total value V ′opt (ρ*) = P (0) − ϵ > 0,
where ϵ is an arbitrarily small positive number. us the worst-case
competitive ratio α ≥ supϵ>0
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) = +∞, which contradicts
the assumption that α is nite.
If the claim does not hold and P (0) = p, there must be a ρ0 ∈
(0, 1/α] such that P (ρ0) > P (ρ) ,∀ρ ∈ [0, ρ0). ere can be a case
where ρ* = ρ0, such that the online total value
V ′ol (ρ*) =
∫ ρ0
0
P (ρ)dρ < ρ0P (ρ0) ,
while the optimal oine total valueV ′opt (ρ*) = P (ρ0)−ϵ . us the
worst-case competitive ratio α ≥ supϵ>0
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) > 1/ρ0, which
contradicts ρ0 ≤ 1/α . 
Theorem 3.7. the pricing function in (2) is optimal according to
Denition 3.2, i.e., using it Algorithm 1 achieves the smallest worst-
case competitive ratio.
Proof. We prove this theorem by way of contradiction. As-
sume that there exists a pricing function, P ′1 (ρ), which achieves a
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worst-case competitive ratio α ′1 < α1. According to Claim 3.1 and
eorem 3.6, we have P ′1 (ρ) = p,∀ρ ∈
[
0, 1/α ′1
]
, and hence∫ 1/α ′1
0
P ′1 (ρ)dρ <
∫ 1/α ′1
0
P1 (ρ)dρ,
where P1 (ρ) is the pricing function in (2).
If there exists some ρ ∈ (1/α ′1, 1) such that P ′1 (ρ) ≥ P1 (ρ) we
nd the smallest one, and denote it by ρ1. en there can be a case
where ρ* = ρ1, such that the online total value
V ′ol (ρ*) =
∫ ρ1
0
P ′1 (ρ)dρ <
∫ ρ1
0
P1 (ρ)dρ = Vol (ρ*) ,
while the optimal oine total value V ′opt (ρ*) = P ′1 (ρ1) − ϵ ≥
P1 (ρ1)−ϵ = Vopt (ρ*), where ϵ is an arbitrarily small positive num-
ber. us the worst-case competitive ratio α ′1 ≥ supϵ>0
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) >
supϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*) = α1, contradicting the assumption α
′
1 < α1.
erefore, P ′1 (ρ) < P1 (ρ) ,∀ρ ∈
(
1/α ′1, 1
)
.
For ρ* = 1, since P ′1 (1) ≤ p (a unit price higher than p will have
all potential users rejected) is nite, we now have
V ′ol (ρ*) =
∫ 1
0
P ′1 (ρ)dρ <
∫ 1
0
P1 (ρ)dρ = Vol (ρ*) .
However, as the resource is exhausted, subsequent users will not
be served, regardless of their valuations. ere can be a case where
the optimal oine total value V ′opt (ρ*) = p = Vopt (ρ*). us
the worst-case competitive ratio α ′1 ≥
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) >
Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*) = α1,
contradicting the assumption that α ′1 < α1. 
We next generalize the optimality result for all β ≥ 1.
Theorem 3.8. For β ≥ 1, the pricing function in (2) is optimal
according to Denition 3.2, and the corresponding worst-case compet-
itive ratio is α1.
Proof. For any possible input set of users, we can prune the
users that can neither be satised by the online solution, nor by the
optimal oine solution, without aecting the online or oine social
welfare, given a certain pricing function. Clearly, the resulting set of
users has a total demand no greater than 2, which can also happen
given any β ≥ 1. Consequently, all the discussions above can be
generalized to β ≥ 1. 
e following property (which holds for all β ≥ 1) is useful
for guiding the design of pricing functions in more realistic cloud
computing scenarios.
Property 1. For the pricing function in (2), and any ρ* ∈ (1/α1, 1],
i.e., the monotonically increasing part of P1 (ρ), we have
sup
ϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*) = α1Vol (ρ*) , (6)
and hence
d supϵ>0Vopt (ρ*)
dρ*
= α1
dVol (ρ*)
dρ*
, (7)
and a constant (w.r.t. ρ*) worst-case competitive ratio, α1.
Proof. e proof is a corollary that follows from Eq. (3), (4),
Lemma 3.5 and eorem 3.5. 
Property 1 is illustrated in Fig. 1b, where the light red area corre-
sponds to dVopt (ρ*)
dρ*

ρ*=0.7, and the light blue area corresponds to
dVol (ρ*)
dρ*

ρ*=0.7. Intuitively, this property implies the best trade-o
between the worst-case competitive ratios corresponding to dier-
ent ρ* values. at is, any changes to the pricing function in (2) that
may decrease the competitive ratio for some ρ*, will unavoidably
increase the competitive ratio for some other ρ*, and thus can only
lead to a worse competitive ratio over all possible values of ρ*.
3.2.2 Pricing Function for Small Total Demand. In the case that
β ∈ (−1, 0], the total resource demand is no larger than the total
resource supply. e optimal strategy is simply serving all user
demands by seing a unit resource price below the smallest per-
unit-resource valuation of cloud users.
Theorem 3.9. For β ∈ (−1, 0], pricing function
P4 (ρ) = p (8)
is optimal according to Denition 3.2, and the corresponding worst-
case competitive ratio achieved by Algorithm 1 is 1.
e proof is straightforward and hence omied.
3.2.3 Pricing Function for Total Demand Up to Twice of Supply.
In the case that β ∈ (0, 1), we rst derive pricing functions that
have Property 1, and then prove the optimality of the functions.
In the following derivation of the pricing functions, we assume
that all pricing functions are continuous and non-decreasing, for
the solution existence of our dierential equations. However, the
assumptions are not required by the proof of optimality. e fol-
lowing claim will be useful for the derivation.
Claim 3.2. For any β > −1, if a pricing function P (ρ) leads to a
nite worst-case competitive ratio of α , then P (ρ) = p,∀ρ ∈ [0, 1/α].
Proof. For β > 0, the proof is similar to that of Claim 3.1 and
is omied. For β ∈ (−1, 0], the claim follows immediately from
eorem 3.9. 
Our derivation of the pricing function is further divided into two
cases.
Case 1: β ∈ (β0, 1) where β0 ∈ (0, 1), such that β > 1/α2 and α2 is
the worst-case competitive ratio achieved using the optimal pricing
function for β ∈ (β0, 1). According to Claim 3.2, the pricing function
P2 (ρ) = p,∀ρ ∈ [0, 1/α2]. When ρ* ∈ (1/α2, 1), as discussed for
Eq. (3), the minimum total value of an online solution is
Vol (ρ*) =
∫ ρ*
0
P2 (ρ)dρ, (9)
and hence
dVol (ρ*)
dρ* =
d
(∫ ρ*
0 P2 (ρ)dρ
)
dρ* = P2 (ρ*) , (10)
which is illustrated by the light blue area in Fig. 2a. Since P2 (ρ)
is non-decreasing, when ρ* ∈ (1/α2, β], we still have Vopt (ρ*) =
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P2 (ρ*) − ϵ as discussed for Eq. (4), where ϵ is an arbitrarily small
positive value. us
d supϵ>0Vopt (ρ*)
dρ* =
dP2 (ρ*)
dρ* . (11)
It follows from Eq. (7), (10) and (11) that
dP2 (ρ)
dρ
− α2P2 (ρ) = 0. (12)
Solving the dierential equation above gives P2 (ρ) = Ceα2ρ , where
C is a constant to be determined. Since we assumed the continuity
of P2 (ρ), we let limρ→1/α2+ P2 (ρ) = P2 (1/α2) = p, and then we
obtain C = p/e , and P2 (ρ) = peα2ρ−1,∀ρ ∈ (1/α2, β].
When ρ* ∈ (β , 1), having a set of users with a unit value of
P2 (ρ*) − ϵ to consume all resource is no longer possible in the
worst case. Instead, there can be a set of unsatised users with a
total demand of 1 + β − ρ*, and with a unit value of P2 (ρ*) − ϵ ,
such that the optimal oine solution yields the maximum optimal
oine total value given Eq. (9):
Vopt (ρ*) = (1 + β − ρ*) (P2 (ρ*) − ϵ) +
∫ ρ*
β
P2 (ρ)dρ, (13)
as shown by the red and yellow AUCs (partially covered by the
blue one) in Fig. 2a. We have
d supϵ>0Vopt (ρ*)
dρ* = (1 + β − ρ*)
dP2 (ρ*)
dρ* , (14)
which is illustrated by the light red areas in Fig. 2a. Note that, there
can be a case which leads to a larger optimal oine total value, by
increasing the value corresponding to ρ ∈ [β , ρ*] (i.e., the yellow
AUC in Fig. 2a). Suppose the increased optimal oine total value is
Vopt (ρ*)+∆ (∆ > 0), the online total value will also be increased to
Vol (ρ*) + ∆. However, since the competitive ratio now changes to
supϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*)+∆
Vol (ρ*)+∆ < supϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*) , it cannot be the worst case.
It follows from Eq. (7), (10) and (14) that
(1 + β − ρ) dP2 (ρ)
dρ
− α2P2 (ρ) = 0. (15)
Solving the dierential equation above gives P2 (ρ) = C(1+β−ρ)−α2 ,
whereC is a constant to be determined. Again, due to the continuity
of P2 (ρ), we let limρ→β+ P2 (ρ) = P2 (β) = peα2β−1. en we
obtain C = peα2β−1, and P2 (ρ) = peα2β−1 (1 + β − ρ)−α2 ,∀ρ ∈
(β, 1]. To have a constant competitive ratio at ρ* = 1− and ρ* = 1,
as suggested by Property 1, we let P2 (1) = peα2β−1β−α2 = p = γp,
which leads to
α2 =
logγ + 1
β − log β . (16)
To obtain the value of β0, let β = β0 = 1/α2. By Eq. (16), we
obtain
β0 =
W (logγ )
logγ . (17)
Here,W (·) is the LamberW -function (a.k.a. the omega function or
the product logarithm), which is the inverse function of f (W ) =
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(a) e worst-case Vol (ρ*) and Vopt (ρ*) for β = 0.5, ρ* = 0.7 visualized by
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(b) Pricing functions and competitive ratios for dierent values of β .
Figure 2: Pricing functions and competitive ratios for β ∈
(0, 1), p = 1, p = 10.
WeW . erefore, for β ∈ (β0, 1), the pricing function is
P2 (ρ) =

p, ρ ∈ [0, 1/α2]
peα2ρ−1, ρ ∈ (1/α2, β]
peα2β−1 (1 + β − ρ)−α2 , ρ ∈ (β, 1)
+∞, ρ = 1
. (18)
An example of P2 (ρ) is shown in Fig. 2b by the dashed line cor-
responding to β = 0.5, where β0 = 0.399. In practice, β can be
estimated or optimized against competitive ratios.
Theorem 3.10. For β ∈ (β0, 1), the pricing function in (18) is
optimal according to Denition 3.2, and the corresponding worst-case
competitive ratio is α2.
Proof. e proof of the worst-case competitive ratio α2 follows
that of eorem 3.6, and is omied.
Suppose there exists a pricing function, P ′2 (ρ), that achieves a
worst-case competitive ratio α ′2 < α2. According to Claim 3.2 and
the proof of eorem 3.7, we have∫ β
0
P ′2 (ρ)dρ <
∫ β
0
P2 (ρ)dρ,
where P2 (ρ) is the pricing function in (18).
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If there exists some ρ ∈ (β , 1) such that P ′2 (ρ) ≥ P2 (ρ) we nd
the smallest one, and denote it by ρ1. en there can be a case
where ρ* = ρ1, such that the online total value
V ′ol (ρ*) =
∫ ρ1
0
P ′2 (ρ)dρ <
∫ ρ1
0
P2 (ρ)dρ − ∆ = Vol (ρ*) − ∆,
where ∆ =
∫ ρ1
β
[
P2 (ρ) − P ′2 (ρ)
]
dρ; while the optimal oine to-
tal value V ′opt (ρ*) ≥ Vopt (ρ*) − ∆ according to Eq. (13). us
the worst-case competitive ratio α ′2 ≥ supϵ>0
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) > supϵ>0
Vopt (ρ*)−∆
Vol (ρ*)−∆ > α2, contradicting the assumption α
′
2 < α2. erefore,
P ′2 (ρ) < P2 (ρ) ,∀ρ ∈ (β , 1).
For ρ* = 1, since P ′2 (1) ≤ p (a unit price higher than p will reject
all potential users) is nite, we now have
V ′ol (ρ*) =
∫ 1
0
P ′2 (ρ)dρ <
∫ 1
0
P2 (ρ)dρ − ∆ = Vol (ρ*) − ∆,
where ∆ =
∫ 1
β
[
P2 (ρ) − P ′2 (ρ)
]
dρ. However, as the resource is
exhausted, subsequent users will not be satised regardless of their
valuations. ere can be a case where the optimal oine total value
V ′opt (ρ*) = Vopt (ρ*) −∆ according to Eq. (13). us the worst-case
competitive ratio α ′2 ≥
V ′opt (ρ*)
V ′ol (ρ*) >
Vopt (ρ*)−∆
Vol (ρ*)−∆ > α2, contradicting
the assumption α ′2 < α2. 
Case 2: β ∈ (0, β0]. From the denition of β0, we have β ≤ 1/α3,
where α3 is the worst-case competitive ratio of the optimal pricing
function in this case. According to Claim 3.2, the pricing function
P3 (ρ) = p,∀ρ ∈ [0, 1/α3]. When ρ* ∈ (1/α3, 1), Vol (ρ*) follows
Eq. (10) with P2 (ρ*) replaced by P3 (ρ*); Vopt (ρ*) follows Eq. (13),
(14) with P2 (ρ*) replaced by P3 (ρ*). en, following Eq. (15), we
have P3 (ρ) = C(1 + β − ρ)−α3 . As discussed for Eq. (16), we let
limρ→1/α3+ P3 (ρ) = P3 (1/α3) = p, P3 (1) = p = γp. Solving the
resulting equations:
C
(
1 + β − 1
α3
)−α3
= p,
Cβ−α3 = γp,
we get
α3 =
logγ
(1 + β) logγ −W (βγ 1+β logγ ) , (19)
and the pricing function for β ∈ (0, β0] is:
P3 (ρ) =

p, ρ ∈ [0, 1/α3]
pγ βα3 (1 + β − ρ)−α3 , ρ ∈ (1/α3, 1)
+∞, ρ = 1
. (20)
An example of P3 (ρ) is shown in Fig. 2b by the dashed line corre-
sponding to β = 0.2.
Theorem 3.11. For β ∈ (0, β0], the pricing function in (20) is
optimal according to Denition 3.2, and the corresponding worst-case
competitive ratio is α3.
Proof. e proof is similar to that of eorem 3.10 and is omit-
ted. 
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Figure 3: Competitive ratios for dierent values of β and γ .
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Figure 4: 2-D pricing function P (ρ; β) for ρ ∈ [0, 1] , β ∈ [0, 1].
To provide a beer understanding on how β ∈ (0, 1) aects the
competitive ratio as dictated by eorems 3.8, 3.10 and 3.11, we
plot the competitive ratio as a function of β in Fig. 3. As shown in
the gure, for a certain value of γ , the competitive ratio decreases
with the decrease of β , and reaches the minimum value 1 when β
drops to 0.
Puing Eq. (2), (18) and (20) together, we have obtained a 2-
dimensional piecewise pricing function, P (ρ; β). An illustration of
the pricing function is given in Fig. 4.
3.3 Linear Operational Cost
Resource provisioning in real-world cloud computing systems oen
incurs an operational cost. If such cost is proportional to the amount
of resources provisioned, then we have a linear operational cost
[29]. We can extend the proposed pricing strategy to accommodate
such linear operational cost by making two modications. First, we
replace Assumption 1 by:
assumption 3. e variability of users’ valuations is constrained,
i.e., p + c ≤ vi/di ≤ p + c .
Here, c ≥ 0 is the operational cost of using a unit of resource.
Second, we replace the pricing functions (2), (18) and (20), by
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P ′1 (ρ) = P1 (ρ) + c , P ′2 (ρ) = P2 (ρ) + c and P ′3 (ρ) = P3 (ρ) + c .
en it is clear that all discussions about the proposed pricing strat-
egy remain valid, including the proof of optimality. In the rest of
this paper, we ignore operational cost for simplicity.
4 PRICING MULTIPLE RESOURCE TYPES
WITH RESOURCE RECYCLING
In this section, we extend our elementary resource allocation prob-
lem in (1) to one with multiple types of resources (Sec. 4.1), and
then further investigate the practical case that resource usage of a
user lasts for multiple time slots (Sec. 4.2). We show that, by care-
fully designing the pricing and scheduling strategy, the worst-case
competitive ratio in social welfare will not be inuenced by the
number of resource types, or by the number of requested time slots.
4.1 Pricing Function for Multiple Types of
Resources
Now we consider a cloud system that provides multiple types of
resources in a set R, as exemplied by CPU, GPU, RAM, and disk
storage. Let di,r be user i’s demand for resource r , ∀r ∈ R. Again,
we assume the total amount of each type of resource is 1, so that
di,r is the proportion of the overall supply of resource r demanded
by i .
e oine social welfare maximization problem is:
maximize
∑
i ∈U
vixi (21)
s.t.: ∑
i ∈U
di,rxi ≤ 1,∀r ∈ R (21a)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ,∀i ∈ U (21b)
e online resource allocation algorithm we apply to determine xi
immediately aer user i comes to the system, is the same as Alg. 1,
except that di and the pricing function will be redened.
Given the optimal pricing functions (2) (for β ≥ 1), (18) (for
β ∈ (β0, 1)), (20) (for β ∈ (0, β0]) and (8) (for β ∈ (−1, 0]) in case of
a single resource type, we can simply price each type of resource
independently as pr , using these pricing functions, and sum them
up by
∑
r ∈R di,rpr to form a total price (a user i accepts the prices
and rents resources at quantitiesdi,r ’s, if and only ifvi is no smaller
than the total price). Before doing so, we need to redene p and p.
One way is to dene them for each type of resource independently,
as p
r
= infi vidi,r , and pr = supi
vi
di,r
, as done by Zhang et al. [29].
However, a drawback of this denition is that pr can be innite, as
we do not assume that every user demands all types of resources. A
remedy to this problem is to dene the same p and p for all types of
resources, as p = infi vidi , and p = supi
vi
di
, where di =
∑
r ∈R di,r .
In this way, Assumption 1 or 3 remains intact. e denitions of p
and p are a simple extension of Assumption 1 for the multi-resource
case. Compared to the former denition, they do not make any
(implicit) assumptions on the ratio of dierent resources each user
demands, and thus are more practical. Moreover, summing up the
demand for dierent types of resources is reasonable when each
di,r is normalized by the total supply of the corresponding resource,
such that their values are all in the range of [0, 1]. en given the
resource utilization ρr and scarcity level βr of each type of resource
r ∈ R, we dene an average unit price for any resource for user i as
Pi (ρ) = 1
di
∑
r ∈R
di,r P (ρr ; βr ) (22)
where ρ denotes the vector of ρr ,∀r ∈ R, and P (ρr ; βr ) is dened
by Eq. (2), (18), (20) and (8). erefore, diPi (ρ) is the total price
for user i . Note that we omit βr inPi (ρ) for notational simplicity,
but dierent βr will lead to dierentPi (ρ).
While it is quite straightforward to adapt the pricing strategy
for a single resource type to the case of multiple resource types,
the resulting worst-case competitive ratio of social welfare will be
dierent. Specically, we denote the nal resource utilization level
of resource r by ρr *,∀r ∈ R, according to Denition 3.3, and we
analyze competitive ratios in three cases: (i) ρr * ∈ [0, 1/αr ] ,∀r ∈
R; (ii) there exists an r ∈ R such that ρr * ∈ (1/αr , 1), but no r ∈ R
such that ρr * = 1; (iii) there exists an r ∈ R such that ρr * = 1. Here,
αr is dened by Eq. (5), (16) or (19) for β = βr . We denote the three
cases by ρ* ∈ Ω1, ρ* ∈ Ω2 and ρ* ∈ Ω3, respectively, and observe
that Ω1 ∪ Ω2 ∪ Ω3 covers all possible values of ρ*. Without loss
of generality, here we assume not all βr ≤ 0, since otherwise the
worst-case competitive ratio would be 1.
Lemma 4.1. For ρ* ∈ Ω1, the worst-case competitive ratio achieved
by Alg. 1 using pricing function (22) for multiple types of resources is
α1 = 1.
Proof. For ρ* ∈ Ω1, according to the pricing function in (22),
Pi (ρ*) = p, which by Assumption 1 is acceptable to any potential
users, thus the total demand of all users for resource r is exactly ρr *.
e social welfare achieved by the pricing function in (22) is the
total value of all users, which is also the maximum possible social
welfare achieved by solving the oine problem (21). erefore, the
worst-case competitive ratio α1 = 1. 
For ρ* ∈ Ω2, we rst present the following claim, which states
that worst cases happen when all users demand only one specic
type of resource, driving the average unit price to go a bit over p.
Claim 4.1. Let ρr * ∈ [0, 1/αr ] for r ∈ R1, ρr * ∈ (1/αr , 1) for
r ∈ R2, where R1 ∪ R2 = R. For ρ* ∈ Ω2, there exists a worst case
that happens when ρr * = 0 for r ∈ R1, and ρr * = 1/αr + ϵ for
r ∈ R2, where |R2 | = 1. Here, ϵ is an arbitrarily small number.
e proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2. For ρ* ∈ Ω2, the corresponding worst-case competitive
ratio α2 = αr
∑
r ∈R min {1, 1 + βr }, where αr is dened by Eq. (5),
(16) or (19) for β = βr , and r = argmaxr ∈R αr .
Proof. According to Claim 4.1, we let ρr * = 0 for r ∈ R1, and
ρr * = 1/αr + ϵ for r ∈ R2, and let |R2 | = 1. en from Eq. (31)
and (32), R2 = {r } maximizes α (ρ*), and thus is a worst case for
ρ* ∈ Ω2. e corresponding competitive ratio
α2 = sup
ϵ>0
∑
r ∈R pmin {1, 1 + βr }
pρr *
= αr
∑
r ∈R
min {1, 1 + βr } . (23)

For ρ* ∈ Ω3, the following claim states that worst cases happen
when all users that are satised by an online solution, demand only
one specic type of resource until it is exhausted.
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Claim 4.2. Let ρr * ∈ [0, 1) for r ∈ R3, ρr * = 1 for r ∈ R4, where
R3 ∪ R4 = R. For ρ* ∈ Ω3, there exists a worst case that happens
when ρr * = 0 for r ∈ R3, and ρr * = 1 for r ∈ R4, where |R4 | = 1.
e proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.3. For ρ* ∈ Ω3, the corresponding worst-case competitive
ratio α3 ≥ αr
∑
r ∈R min {1, 1 + βr }.
Proof. According to Claim 4.2, we let ρr * = 0 for r ∈ R3, and
ρr * = 1 for r ∈ R4, and let |R4 | = 1. en from Eq. (33) and (34),
we have the worst-cast competitive ratio for ρ* ∈ Ω3
α3 = max
r ′∈R′
∑
r ∈R\{r ′ } pmin {1, 1 + βr } + αr ′
∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr ′)dρ∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr ′)dρ
,
(24)
where R′ = {r |βr > 0}. Since it is assumed that βr > 0, we have
min {1, 1 + βr } = 1, and hence
αr
∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ
=
pmin {1, 1 + βr }
p/αr
.
And since αr
∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ ≤ pmin {1, 1 + βr }, we have
α3 ≥
∑
r ∈R\{r } pmin {1, 1 + βr } + αr
∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ
≥
∑
r ∈R pmin {1, 1 + βr }
p/αr
= αr
∑
r ∈R
min {1, 1 + βr } .

By Lemma 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.4. e worst-case competitive ratio achieved by Alg. 1
using the pricing function in (15) for multiple types of resources is
given by Eq. (24).
As shown by Lemma 4.3, the worst-case competitive ratio for
multiple resource types increases roughly linearly with the number
of resource types. However, from Claim 4.1, 4.2, and the analysis
above, it is clear that the worst cases happen in very extreme sce-
narios, where all satised users demand only one type of resource,
which is rather unrealistic in practical cloud computing systems. In
fact, the supply of and the demand for resources in a cloud comput-
ing system are oen balanced to some extent, since otherwise the
supply would be adjusted to beer meet the demand of users and
to improve the system eciency. Hence, we make the following
realistic assumption:
assumption 4. All types of resources share a common scarcity
level, βR > 0, and hence a common αR as dened by Eq. (5), (16) or
(19) for β = βR ; and the nal utilization vector, ρ*, follows
minr ∈R ρr *
maxr ∈R ρr *
≥ η. (25)
Assumption 4 leads to an improved competitive ratio.
Theorem 4.5. Under Assumption 4, the worst-case competitive
ratio with the pricing function in (15) is upper bounded by a constant
with respect to |R |.
Proof. It is easy to prove that Claim 4.1 and 4.2 are still valid
under Assumption 4. For ρ* ∈ Ω2, any worst case gives Vol (ρ*) =
[1 + (|R| − 1)η]p/αR and Vopt (ρ*) = |R | p, and hence the corre-
sponding competitive ratio α2 = |R |1+( |R |−1)η αR . Since η ≤ 1, we
have α2 ≤ αR/η. For ρ* ∈ Ω3, as ϵ → 0, any worst case gives
Vol (ρ*) =
∫ 1
0
P (ρ; βR )dρ + (|R| − 1)
∫ η
0
P (ρ; βR )dρ,
and
Vopt (ρ*) = αRVol (ρ*)
+ (|R| − 1) (1 + βR − η)
(
p − P (η; βR )
)
,
and hence the corresponding competitive ratio
α3 = αR +
(1 + βR − η)
(
p − P (η; βR )
)∫ 1
0 P (ρ; βR )dρ/(|R| − 1) +
∫ η
0 P (ρ; βR )dρ
.
Let θ =
(1 + βR − η)
(
p − P (η; βR )
)∫ η
0 P (ρ; βR )dρ
,
we have α3 < αR + θ . erefore, the worst-cast competitive ratio
under Assumption 4 is upper bounded by max{αR/η,αR + θ }. 
eorem 4.5 justies the use of the pricing function in (22), which
is a direct extension of the optimal pricing functions for the single
resource type case, but achieves a reasonably good (degraded by
a constant factor w.r.t. |R |) competitive ratio in scenarios with
multiple resource types.
4.2 Pricing Function for Multiple Time Slots
In real-world cloud systems, a user job runs over its specied re-
source bundle in the cloud, across one or more time slots. Once the
job is completed, the resources that it occupies are then released
back to the cloud pool. erefore, cloud resources can be reused
over time. Let T denote the set of all time slots that the system
spans, and Ti be the set of time slots when user i requires to use
resources. yi (t) is an indication function as follows:
yi (t) =
{
1, t ∈ Ti
0, otherwise
. (26)
e oine social welfare maximization problem becomes:
maximize
∑
i ∈U
vixi (27)
s.t.: ∑
i ∈U
di,rxiyi (t) ≤ 1,∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T (27a)
xi ∈ {0, 1} ,∀i ∈ U (27b)
Since yi (t) is input (not a variable) in this optimization problem,
problem (27) is still an ILP. e online resource allocation algorithm
we apply to determine xi upon the arrival of user i is still the same
as Alg. 1, except that di and the pricing function will be redened,
and yi (t) needs to be further determined.
In fact, problem (21) and problem (27) are equivalent if we con-
sider resource r in dierent time slots to be of dierent resource
types. More specically, let di,r (t ) = di,ryi (t), where r (t) ∈ R (t),
and t ∈ T . en problem (27) will have exactly the same form as
problem (27). erefore, according to Lemma 4.3 and eorem 4.4,
the worst-case competitive ratio will increase roughly linearly with
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the number of time slots, |T |, if no other assumptions are made. If
the number of slots required by each user is upper bounded, then
the worst-case competitive ratio will increase roughly linearly with
the maximum number of slots required by each user, which is also
undesirable. Intuitively, this issue is caused by the fact that, if one
of the time slots required by a user is unavailable (e.g., no available
resources), then the demand of the user cannot be satised as a
whole, even if other required slots are all available.
To address the aforementioned problem, we propose a strategy
that satises users’ demand in an elastic manner. Specically, as-
suming we are allowed to satisfy user i with any |Ti | slots in a larger
set of time slots, T ′i ⊇ Ti , we can signicantly improve the compet-
itive ratio by choosing |Ti | slots from T ′i that yield the lowest total
price. Concretely, the corresponding online resource scheduling
strategy is that, we try to satisfy each user i with |Ti | time slots
chosen from T ′i , and
T ′i  = dλ |Ti |e, where λ is a constant factor.
Here T ′i can be interpreted as the allowed (loosened) time interval
for completing the user’s job. e overall price to user i is computed
as the minimum possible total price of |Ti | time slots selected from
T ′i .
From the user perspective, the price each user receives is deter-
mined upon its arrival in the system, and does not change aer-
wards. A user i accepts the price and leases resource at quantities
di,r ’s in the chosen |Ti | time slots, if and only if vi is no smaller
than the overall price. Once a user accepts the price, its job is guar-
anteed to be completed within λ |Ti |. If the provider tells that a job
cannot be completed within λ |Ti |, the job will receive an innitely
high price according to the pricing function upon arrival (i.e., the
user will reject the price and the job will not be executed).
In fact, similar non-consecutive execution schemes have been
implemented on Amazon EC2 Spot Instance [2], and have been
discussed in the literature [30]. Here, we further justify the use
of non-consecutive execution schemes from a theoretical point of
view.
Without loss of generality, we assume both Ti and T ′i are con-
secutive time slots; and if Ti = [τi ,τi + |Ti | − 1], we let T ′i =[
τi ,τi +
T ′i  − 1] . To formulate the oine version of the modi-
ed social welfare maximization problem, we can add the following
constraints to problem (27):∑
t ∈T′i
yi (t) = |Ti | ,∀i ∈ U (27c)
yi (t) ∈ {0, 1} ,∀i ∈ U, t ∈ T (27d)
Note that yi (t) now follows Eq. (27c) and (27d), instead of Eq. (26),
and yi (t) becomes a variable. erefore, the new problem is no
longer an ILP.
We reuse the notationPi (·) to denote the pricing function for
user i; and we reuse the symbols, di and ρ, to taken into account
dierent time slots, i.e., di = |Ti |∑r ∈R di,r , and ρ denotes the
vector of ρr (t) ,∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T . e denitions ofp andp remain the
same, i.e., p = infi vidi and p = supi
vi
di
. en under Assumption 4,
our pricing strategy for online resource allocation can be described
by the following pricing function:
Pi (ρ) = 1
di
min
yi ∈Yi

∑
t ∈T′i
∑
r ∈R
di,ryi (t) P (ρr (t) ; βR )
 , (28)
where Yi is dened by Eq. (27c) and (27d), and P (ρr (t); βR ) is
dened by Eq. (2), (18) and (20). Obviously, diPi (ρ) is the total
price for user i .
In general, Pi (ρ) sets dierent unit prices for dierent time
slots, according to the scheduled resource utilization levels. Note
that, the overall price that each user receives for its resource demand
over the requested resource usage duration is determined when
the user comes to the system and requests resources, and does not
change over the course.
Given an arbitrary set of time slots T , and the corresponding
time horizon |T |, any Ti * T can be ignored since it cannot be
satised anyway. Furthermore, we ignore the marginal eect of
any T ′i * T , since |T | is usually signicantly larger than
T ′i .
us, we assume Ti ,T ′i ⊆ T ,∀i ∈ U. As we did to analyze
competitive ratios for multiple resource types, we divide possi-
ble values of nal resource utilization levels into three cases: (i)
ρr * (t) ∈ [0, 1/αR ] ,∀r ∈ R, t ∈ T ; (ii) there exists an r ∈ R and a
t ∈ T such that ρr * (t) ∈ (1/αR , 1), but no r ∈ R or t ∈ T such
that ρr * (t) = 1; (iii) there exists an r ∈ R and a t ∈ T such that
ρr * (t) = 1. Here, αR is dened by Eq. (5), (16) or (19) for β = βR .
We denote the three cases by ρ* ∈ Π1, ρ* ∈ Π2 and ρ* ∈ Π3,
respectively.
Lemma 4.6. For ρ* ∈ Π1, the worst-case competitive ratio achieved
by our online resource scheduling strategy using pricing function (28)
is α1 = 1.
Proof. e proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.1 and is omied.

Lemma 4.7. For ρ* ∈ Π2, the corresponding worst-case competitive
ratio α2 < αR(λ−1)η + 1, where η is dened as in Assumption 4.
Proof. Let T1 = {t |ρr * (t) ∈ [0, 1/αR ] ,∀r ∈ R}, and T2 = {t |
ρr * (t) ∈ (1/αR , 1) ,∃r ∈ R}, and T1 ∪ T2 = T . For ρ* ∈ Π2,
following the proof of Lemma 4.1, there exists a worst case that
happens when ρr * (t) = 0 for all r ∈ R and t ∈ T1; while for t ∈ T2,
ρr * (t) = 1/αr + ϵ for some r ′ ∈ R, and ρr * (t) = η (1/αr + ϵ) for
r ∈ R\ {r ′}. Here, ϵ is an arbitrarily small number. Following the
proof of eorem 4.5, as ϵ → 0, we have
Vol (ρ*) = |T2 | [1 + (|R| − 1)η]p/αR ,
as the minimum total value of the online solution. For any Ti ,
since
T ′i  = dλ |Ti |e, the demand will be satised regardless of the
user’s valuation, unless
T ′i ∩ T2 > d λ−1λ T ′i e. In other words, if
the demand of user i is not satised by the online solution, there
must be at least d λ−1λ
T ′i e time slots in T ′i that also belong to
T2; or equivalently, for any S ⊆ T , and any T ′i ⊆ S that is not
satised by the online solution,
T ′i  < b λλ−1 |S ∩ T2 |c, and hence
|Ti | < b 1λ−1 |S ∩ T2 |c. Let T ′2 be the union of all sets of consecutive
time slots that contain T2, and have a cardinality of b λλ−1 |T2 |c − 1.
When |Ti | < b 1λ−1 |S ∩ T2 |c, since at least one type of resource in
at least one required time slot has a unit price above p, there can
be a set of users in a worst case, demanding all resources in
T ′2 
time slots, withPi (ρ) = p, where
T ′2  < 2b 1λ−1 |T2 |c + |T2 |. us
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we have the maximum optimal oine total value
Vopt (ρ*) <
T ′2  |R | p < (2b 1λ − 1 |T2 |c + |T2 |) |R | p.
erefore, for ρ* ∈ Π2, the worst-cast competitive ratio
α2 <
λ+1
λ−1 |R | |T2 | p
|T2 | [1 + (|R| − 1)η]p/αR
=
λ + 1
λ − 1
|R |
1 + (|R| − 1)ηαR
≤ (λ + 1)αR(λ − 1)η .
(29)

Lemma 4.8. For ρ* ∈ Π3, the corresponding worst-case competitive
ratio α3 < λ+1(λ−1)η′ , where η
′ =
∫ η
0 P (ρ; βR )dρ/p.
Proof. Let T3 = {t |ρr * (t) ∈ [0, 1) ,∀r ∈ R}, and T4 = {t |ρr * (t)
= 1,∃r ∈ R}, and T3 ∪ T4 = T . For ρ* ∈ Π2, following the proof of
Lemma 4.2, there exists a worst case that happens when ρr * (t) = 0
for all r ∈ R and t ∈ T3; while for t ∈ T4, ρr * (t) = 1 for some
r ′ ∈ R, and ρr * (t) = η for r ∈ R\ {r ′}. Following the proof of
eorem 4.5, we have
Vol (ρ*) = |T4 |
[∫ 1
0
P (ρ; βR )dρ + (|R| − 1)
∫ η
0
P (ρ; βR )dρ
]
,
as the minimum total value of the online solution. For any Ti ,
since
T ′i  = dλ |Ti |e, the demand will be satised regardless of the
user’s valuation, unless
T ′i ∩ T4 > d λ−1λ T ′i e. In other words, if
the demand of user i is not satised by the online solution, there
must be at least d λ−1λ
T ′i e time slots in T ′i that also belong to
T4; or equivalently, for any S ⊆ T , and any T ′i ⊆ S that is not
satised by the online solution,
T ′i  < b λλ−1 |S ∩ T4 |c, and hence
|Ti | < b 1λ−1 |S ∩ T4 |c. Let T ′4 be the union of all sets of consecutive
time slots that contain T4, and have a cardinality of b λλ−1 |T4 |c − 1.
When |Ti | < b 1λ−1 |S ∩ T4 |c, since at least one type of resource in
at least one required time slot is fully occupied, there can be a set
of users in a worst case, demanding all resources in
T ′4  time slots,
withPi (ρ) = p, where
T ′4  < 2b 1λ−1 |T4 |c + |T4 |. us we have
the maximum optimal oine total value
Vopt (ρ*) <
T ′4  |R | p < (2b 1λ − 1 |T4 |c + |T4 |) |R | p.
erefore, for ρ* ∈ Π2, the worst-cast competitive ratio
α3 <
λ+1
λ−1 |R | |T4 | p
|R | |T4 |
∫ η
0 P (ρ; βR )dρ
=
λ + 1
(λ − 1)η′ .
(30)

Theorem 4.9. e worst-cast competitive ratio achieved by our
online resource scheduling strategy using pricing function (28) is upper
bounded by λ+1λ−1 max{αR/η, 1/η′}, which is a constant with respect
to both |R | and |T |. Here, αR is dened by Eq. (5), (16) or (19) for
β = βR , and η is dened as in Assumption 4.
Proof. e theorem follows immediately from Lemmas 4.6, 4.7
and 4.8. 
5 EMPIRICAL STUDIES
In this section, we evaluate the proposed pricing and scheduling
strategies through simulation studies. To simulate realistic cloud
computing scenarios, we relax all the assumptions made before, i.e.,
our parameter seings approximate reality rather than following
assumptions we used for theoretical analysis. We use a Poisson
process to model the arrival of users, and set the arrival rate to be
between 20 and 50 per time slot. Each user requests 5 time slots on
average and 5 dierent types of resources at most, if not otherwise
specied. Each user demands 1 to 3 percent of each type of resource
on average,1 with dierent standard deviation for dierent resource
types, ranging from 0.2 percent to 2 percent. We set λ = 1.2 by
default. e time horizon of simulations is set to 1000 time slots,
which is large enough compared to the demand of each user. e
statistics of the random input variables are stationary in all cases
except the last one (shown in Fig. 8). e optimal oine total values
are obtained by solving problem (27) with constraints (27c) and
(27d).
By relaxing the assumptions, we can now optimize the param-
eters in our pricing functions, e.g., β , p and p, to maximize the
average total social welfare. Specically, we use paern search for
the optimization: we repeat each experiment for multiple iterations;
in the rst iteration, we x the parameters to random estimates;
then we add a perturbation (decays with iterations) to each param-
eter and run the experiment again; a perturbation is retained from
one iteration to the next if the total value is improved. In practice,
similar probing of parameter values can be done through online
learning techniques such as reinforcement learning.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that, under mild assumptions,
the worst-case competitive ratio of social welfare is mainly inu-
enced by the total demand level (see Fig. 3), but not by the number
of resource types (eorem 4.5), nor by the number of requested
time slots (eorem 4.9). We now investigate the impact of the
three factors on the social welfare and competitive ratio, as well as
the robustness of the theoretical results, when the assumptions are
relaxed.
To quantify dierent demand levels, we dene the relative total
demand as the ratio between the total demand of all potential users
and the total resource supply Fig. 5 shows that, the optimal oine
total value, Vopt , increases almost linearly with a slope of 1, as
the total demand increases. At the same time, the online total
value, Vol , increases with a smaller slope, causing the competitive
ratio to increase noticeably from 1.09 to 1.78. Although the results
exhibit the average system performance (rather than worst-case
competitive ratios), it coincides with our worst-case analysis on
the scarcity level, β , where larger β leads to a larger competitive
ratio (see Fig. 3).
Next, we vary the number of resource types, |R |, from 1 to 10
to see how it aects the competitive ratio. As shown in Fig. 6, due
to the increase in total demand and total supply, both Vopt and
1We note these percentages are quite large as compared to the practice that a user may
use only a very small percentage of the entire capacity of a cloud system. We set such
percentages to evaluate performance of our pricing functions in case that Assumption
2 is not true.
Optimal Posted Prices for Online Cloud Resource Allocation SIGMETRICS ’17, June 5–9, 2017, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA
1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
Relative total demand
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
R
el
at
iv
e 
so
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Co
m
pe
tit
ive
 ra
tio
Figure 5: Online/oline social welfares and competitive ra-
tios given dierent total demands.
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Figure 6: Online/oline social welfares and competitive ra-
tios given dierent numbers of resource types.
Vol increase linearly with the increase of |R |, while Vopt increases
slightly faster than Vol . Consequently, the competitive ratio only
increases mildly (from 1.34 to 1.57) as |R | increases. e results
may indicate that Assumption 4 is slightly violated in practice,
since larger |R | can increase the chance of unbalanced resource
utilization.
Similarly, it is also interesting to see how the number of time slots
required by each user aects the competitive ratio. Dierent from
the case of varying |R |, only the total demand will increase with the
average number of required time slots. us we adjust the demand
of each user accordingly to eliminate the eect of increasing relative
total demand (see Fig. 5). As we can see in Fig. 7a, Vopt and Vol
stay almost the same as the average number of required time slots
increases, and so does the competitive ratio (varying slightly from
1.41 to 1.48). To further verify the proposed strategies, we vary the
value of λ from 1 to 1.4 as shown in Fig. 7b. We test the performance
for two dierent demand levels, with relative total demands of 1.5
and 3, respectively. In this case, Vopt stays almost the same as λ
changes and is omied from the gure. Clearly, Vol increases more
from λ = 1 to λ = 1.2 than from λ = 1.2 to λ = 1.4, indicating
λ = 1.2 is a good trade-o between the availability and timeliness
of service.
e simulations conducted so far are based on stationary arrival
processes of users. In practice, however, the arrival rate may change
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(a) Online/oline social welfares and competitive ratios given dierent
numbers of required time slots.
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(b) Online social welfare at dierent values of λ.
Figure 7: Performance of the elastic scheduling strategy dis-
cussed in Sec. 4.2.
over time (e.g., uctuating periodically). To capture this characteris-
tic, we vary the arrival rate according to a sine curve with a period
of 100 time slots. In Fig. 8, as we increase the amplitude of the sine
curve from 0 to 1 (normalized by the average arrival rate), bothVopt
and Vol decrease signicantly, while the competitive ratio remains
at around 1.5. e reason behind the results is that, when the arrival
rate is very low, the resource utilization ratios stay low, so that
almost all demands can be satised; while when the arrival rate is
very high, a high proportion of the demands cannot be satised by
either the optimal oine solution or the online solution.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
is paper studies online posted pricing strategies in a number
of cloud resource allocation scenarios. We start by investigating
the basic case of a single type of cloud resource without resource
recycling, and prove optimality of a set of exponential pricing func-
tions in terms of social welfare, which compute unit resource prices
based on realtime demand-supply of cloud resources. Exploiting
the insights acquired, we further derive pricing functions in prac-
tical scenarios with multiple resource types and limited resource
occupation durations, and prove tight competitive ratio bounds
achieved using these functions, without relying on any particular
user arrival process or valuation distribution. Relaxing assump-
tions made in theoretical analysis, empirical studies further reveal
good performance of our pricing functions under realistic seings.
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Figure 8: Online/oline social welfare and competitive ra-
tios given dierent levels of arrival rate uctuations.
ough set up in a cloud computing environment, our models and
algorithms are also applicable to posted pricing in other related
online resource allocation problems.
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A PROOF OF CLAIM 4.1
Proof. e worst case of online solution is that the valuations
of satised users are the same as the prices they accept. us by
Assumption 2, we have
Vol (ρ*) =
∑
r ∈R
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ
=
∑
r ∈R1
ρr *p +
∑
r ∈R2
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ,
(31)
as the minimum total value of the online solution. On the other
hand, any unsatised user i has an average unit value less than
Pi (ρ*), because otherwise ρ* cannot be the nal resource utiliza-
tion. We can decompose each user’s value asvi =
∑
r ∈R di,rUi,r (ρ),
and
Ui,r (ρ) = vi
diPi (ρ)P (ρr ; βr ) ,
such that a user i’s average unite valuevi/di <Pi (ρ*) if and only
ifUi,r (ρ*) < P (ρr ; βr ), for any r ∈ R. Here,Ui,r (ρ*) can be seen
as user i’s unit value of resource r given a certain ρ*.
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For r ∈ R1, in the worst case, there can be a set of unsatis-
ed users with a total demand of min {1, 1 + βr } for each type
of resource, and with a unit value Ui,r (ρ*) = p − ϵr . Note that
Ui,r (ρ*) < p does not contradict with Assumption. 1, since a small
enough ϵr can ensure vi/di ≥ p. For r ∈ R2, the discussion on
Eq. (3), (9) for a single resource type is still valid if we consider
Ui,r (ρ*) as unit value of resource; and according to Eq. (6), we have
Vopt (ρr *) = αrVol (ρr *) − ϵr = αr
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ) − ϵr .
is yields the maximum optimal oine total value given Eq. (31):
Vopt (ρ*) =
∑
r ∈R1
pmin {1, 1 + βr }
+
∑
r ∈R2
αr
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ − ϵ .
(32)
For r ∈ R1, ρr * only aects the rst term of Eq. (31), while the
rst term of Eq. (32) is a constant with respect to ρr *. us in any
worst case, the rst term of Eq. (31) should be minimized, and hence
ρr * = 0,∀r ∈ R1. For r ∈ R2, let Vol (ρr *) =
∫ ρr *
0 P (ρ; βr )dρ, we
have
α (ρ*) = supϵ>0Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*)
≥
∑
r ∈R2 αrVol (ρr *)∑
r ∈R2 Vol (ρr *)
≥αr
∑
r ∈R2 Vol (ρr *)∑
r ∈R2 Vol (ρr *)
= αr ,
where r = argminr ∈R2 αr . When |R2 | ≥ 2, we can iteratively
move r from R2 to R1, and set ρr * = 0 without decreasing α (ρ*),
until |R2 | = 1, since
supϵ>0
(
Vopt (ρ*) − αrVol (ρr *) − ϵ + pmin
{
1, 1 + βr
})
Vol (ρ*) −Vol (ρr *)
≥ supϵ>0Vopt (ρ*)
Vol (ρ*)
.
Similarly, for the only r ∈ R2, we can decrease ρr * to 1/αr + ϵ
without decreasing α (ρ*). erefore, for ρ* ∈ Ω2, there exists a
worst case that happenswhen ρr * = 0 for r ∈ R1, and ρr * = 1/αr+ϵ
for r ∈ R2, where |R2 | = 1. 
B PROOF OF CLAIM 4.2
Proof. e worst case of online solution is that the valuations
of satised users are the same as the prices they accept. us by
Assumption 2, we have
Vol (ρ*) =
∑
r ∈R
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ
=
∑
r ∈R3
∫ ρr *
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ +
∑
r ∈R4
∫ 1
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ,
(33)
as the minimum total value of the online solution. On the other
hand, since there is at least one type of resource being fully occupied,
i.e., |R4 | ≥ 1, there can be a case where all subsequent users demand
a small amount of resource r ∈ R4, making it impossible to satisfy
their demands regardless of their valuations. Hence the maximum
optimal oine total value
Vopt (ρ*) =
∑
r ∈R3
∫ ρ2r
ρ1r
P (ρ; βr )dρ
+
∑
r ∈R3
pmin {1, 1 + βr − ρr *}
+
∑
r ∈R4
αr
∫ 1
0
P (ρ; βr )dρ,
(34)
where ρ1r = max {0, βr } and ρ2r = max {βr , ρr *}.
For r ∈ R3, Eq. (33) stays the same or increases as any ρr *
increases, while Eq. (34) stays the same or decreases. us there
exists a worst case where ρr * = 0,∀r ∈ R3. Let r = argminr ∈R4 αr .
Due to the same reason as discussed for Eq. (31) and Eq. (32), when
|R4 | ≥ 2, we can iteratively move r from R4 to R3, and set ρr * = 0
without decreasing the competitive ratio, until |R4 | = 1. 
